Infertility currently affects over 6 million individuals in the United States. While most health insurance plans nationwide do not cover infertility diagnoses or treatments, to date fifteen states have enacted some form of infertility insurance mandate. In this paper, I use data from the Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and Census population estimates to examine whether these statelevel mandates were successful in increasing fertility rates. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I exploit variation in the enactment of mandates both across states and over time, and identify control groups that should not have been affected by infertility coverage. My results suggest that the mandates significantly increase first birth rates for women over 35, and these results are robust to a number of specification tests.
I. Introduction
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has defined infertility to be a disease of the reproductive system. Like other diseases, it imposes significant costs on women and families. The psychological effects of infertility have been compared to the effects of other diseases such as cancer and heart disease (e.g. Fidler and Bernstein, 1999) , and the financial costs of treatment can be quite large. These costs are currently borne by a large number of individuals, as infertility affects over 6 million individuals, and one in ten couples cannot conceive without medical assistance. However, only 25 percent of all health plan sponsors provide coverage for infertility services.
The ASRM has stated, "The desire to have children and be parents is one of the most fundamental aspects of being human. People should not be denied insurance coverage for medically appropriate treatment to fulfill this goal."
1 In response to a perceived need for coverage, legislation was introduced at the federal level in 2003 that would require health plans to provide infertility benefits. 2 As the fraction of the population affected by infertility continues to rise, there are likely to be continued efforts to mandate coverage. Understanding the costs and benefits of these policies thus becomes increasingly important.
As of 2003, fifteen states have enacted some form of infertility insurance mandate. I use Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and Census population estimates to examine whether these state-level mandates were successful in increasing fertility rates. Using a difference-indifferences approach, I exploit variation in the enactment of mandates both across states and over time, and identify control groups that should not have been affected by infertility coverage. My 1 www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.htm 2 The Family Building Act of 2003 (HR 3014) would require insurance coverage of infertility treatment (including up to four in vitro fertilization (IVF) attempts) by all group health plans that also require obstetrical benefits.
results suggest that the mandates significantly increase first birth rates for women over 35, and these results are robust to a number of specification tests.
II. Background Information

A. Incidence of Infertility/Impaired Fecundity
There are a variety of problems associated with defining infertility as well as with obtaining standardized measures of its incidence that can be followed over time. Demographers using the National Survey of Family Growth have used two criteria to classify whether women are having difficulties in childbearing. Infertility only applies to married or cohabiting women, and is defined as the condition of being unable to conceive after 12 or more consecutive months of unprotected intercourse. Impaired fecundity, however, applies to women of any marital or cohabiting status, and is defined as having problems with conceiving or carrying a pregnancy to term, as well as being unable to conceive after 3 years of unprotected intercourse (Chandra and Stephen, 1998) . 3, 4 Overall, the proportion of women reporting impaired fecundity has risen only 2 percentage points between 1982 and 1995, from 8% to 10%. However, due to increasing numbers of women between the ages of 15-44, there has actually been a dramatic increase in the number of women reporting infecundity, from 4.6 million to 6.2 million. 5 This increase has occurred across almost all subgroups of women, including along the dimensions of marital status, income, education, race, and ethnicity (Chandra and Stephen, 1998) . The one dimension on which fertility-impaired women differ from the general population of women is age --43%
are aged 35-44, as compared with 36% of the general population (Stephen and Chandra, 2000) 3 Both conditions only apply to those women who are not surgically sterile. 4 However, the ASRM does not, in official documents, make this distinction. 5 One reason given for this increase is delay of childbearing to later ages that are associated with decreased fertility.
Another possibility is that an increase in attention paid to infertility by the media may have increased women's awareness of potential fertility problems, leading to an increase in self-reports.
Treatments for infertility can be extremely expensive. Most instances of impaired fecundity are treated by "conventional" methods such as drug treatment or surgical repair of reproductive organs. Some of the less invasive therapies such as hormone therapy can range from $200-$3,000 per cycle. Tubal surgery can range from $10,000-$15,000, requires a hospital stay and poses a high risk of complication (Resolve, 2003) . In vitro fertilization (IVF) accounts for approximately five percent of all infertility treatments, and the average cost of an IVF cycle in the United States is $12,400 (ASRM, 2003) .
Despite the large and growing share of the population that faces infertility problems, and despite the large financial costs of treatment, health care coverage of treatment is limited.
Nationwide, only 25% of health care plans cover infertility treatment, and coverage varies significantly by state. 6 Of the 6.2 million women with impaired fecundity in 1995, 2.7 million (44%) had ever sought treatment. Of that group, 700,000 women had sought treatment within the past year. However, as a result of the high (and often uninsured) costs associated with treatment, medical assistance for infertility is sought primarily by women and couples that are white, college-educated, and affluent. Women with private health insurance coverage were 50% more likely to have received services, as were women with income more than 300% of the poverty line (Stephen and Chandra, 2000) . This is the case even though increases in infertility over time have occurred across all race, ethnicity, income, and education groups (see Chandra and Stephen (1998) and Stephen and Chandra (2000) ). It is widely believed that there is an unmet need for infertility services, especially among those with lower incomes and lower levels of education (Chandra & Mosher 1994) . 6 As a comparison, in 2002 78% of covered workers had coverage for oral contraceptives (Kaiser Foundation, 2002) , and a study of health plans found that 57% covered colonoscopy (Klabunde et al., 2004) .
B. State Mandates
The first state-level infertility insurance mandate was enacted by West Virginia in 1977.
Since that time, fourteen other states have passed mandates, and additional states have ongoing legislative advocacy efforts in this area. Of the traditional economic justifications for mandated benefits (e.g. Summers, 1989; Gruber, 1994) ), the best efficiency argument is that asymmetric information between the patient and insurer will lead to an adverse selection problem so that benefits will not be provided by the private market (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 ).
In addition, two externality arguments can be made for mandated infertility coverage.
Both deal with multiple births, which are costly to society and are generally paid for by higher health insurance premiums for everyone. First, if fertility drugs and IVF are substitutes, and if cheaper fertility drugs increase the incidence of multiple births, then subsidizing IVF might reduce the number of multiple births. Second, since IVF is so expensive, if a couple chooses to undergo this treatment and bears the full cost, there is a great deal of pressure for a successful cycle. This could lead to more embryos being transplanted per cycle, which increases the probability of multiple births. Studies (Jain et al. (2002) , Reynolds et al. (2003) , and Hamilton and McManus (2005) ) find evidence that the presence of an IVF mandate reduces the number of embryos transplanted per cycle.
The mandates that have been passed vary along several dimensions. A mandate "to cover" requires that health insurance companies provide coverage of infertility treatment as a benefit included in every policy. A mandate "to offer" requires that health insurance companies make available for purchase a policy which offers coverage of infertility treatment. In addition, some mandates cover all health plans, while others either exclude health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or only cover HMOs. Finally some mandates exclude coverage of IVF, which is one of the most expensive treatments available for infertility. By reducing the price of infertility treatment, we might expect to see an increase in utilization of treatments. This could be true if the mandate expands access to individuals who previously could not afford treatment, or if individuals who were previously receiving treatment now choose to consume higher quantities (or a higher quality) of treatment. However, it is also possible that these mandates have no effect on access or on treatment consumed, but simply provide windfall gains to those individuals who would have purchased treatment in the absence of insurance coverage. Finally, mandates may also have dynamic effects on the timing of births.
Individuals could seek treatment earlier, which is beneficial from a medical perspective.
Alternatively, individuals could further delay childbearing, with the knowledge that they will ultimately be covered.
To date only a few studies have looked at the effects of these mandates. Jain et al. (2002) and Reynolds et al. (2003) In this paper, I use a difference-in-differences approach where I exploit variation in the enactment of mandates both across states and over time to determine whether these mandates have been successful in increasing first birth rates. By analyzing birth rates rather than IVF utilization, I can estimate the total effects of the mandates on fertility, which will include increases resulting from all types of infertility treatments.
III. Data
Information on births comes from Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data, gathered by the National Center for Health Statistics. This information is based on birth certificate data, and includes specific information about the timing, parity (whether it was a first or subsequent birth), and plurality (whether it was a single, twin, triplet, or higher order birth) of each birth. These data also include demographic information on the mother, including age, race, ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment. Geographic information about the mother's state of residence is also provided. Beginning in 1985 the data cover every birth in the United States. The counts of births by state, year, race, and five-year age cohort are used to generate birth rates.
9
The denominators for birth rates must come from another data source, since the birth certificates only provide information on those women who actually give birth. Population estimates are available for black and non-black women by age and state through the Census Bureau, and can be used to calculate birth rates. Ideally, the denominator would include only those women who have not yet had a first birth. However, the Census data do not allow for further breakouts. Birth counts by parity of the mother can be calculated, but denominators with counts of women by the number of children they have already borne cannot be generated. Other control variables, collected by state and by year, come from a variety of publicly available sources. Summary statistics for the data set, which covers the years 1985-1999, can be found in Appendix B.
10
IV. Model Specification
I estimate the following model:
9 Five year cohorts are used up to the age of 49 (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49) . The maximum age reported by the Vital Statistics Data was 49 through 1996, and in 1997 births to women up to the age of 54 were also reported. I omit births to women 50 and older to maintain consistency across years. 10 The last mandate passed during this sample period was Ohio, in 1991. All results are robust to analyzing the shorter period of years from 1985-1993. 
where the dependent variable is the log first birth rate for age cohort a in state j and year t. 11 The first birth rate is equal to the number of first births within an age cohort-race-state-year cell, divided by the number of women in that same age cohort-race-state-year cell. I focus on first birth rates, because treatments are more likely to be sought by women who have not already borne children.
The independent variable of primary interest, Mand, is an indicator for whether a state had an infertility insurance mandate in place in a given year. In the specification, a mandate is not allowed to affect fertility rates in the year it is enacted, but can instead affect fertility rates with a two year lag. This is to account for two factors: 1) infertility treatments often do not result in an immediate conception; and 2) even if a conception occurs immediately, there is still a necessary nine-month waiting period before those new conceptions can affect fertility rates.
12 If the mandates have been successful at increasing access to infertility treatments, and if these treatments have been successful, then the estimated coefficient on this variable is expected to be positive.
11 Other papers examining fertility often use the log birth rate as the dependent variable (for example, see Klerman (1999) , and Dee (2001)), despite an ongoing debate in the literature about whether this practice is appropriate (e.g. Manning and Mullahy (2001) . One specific concern with the log specification used here is the presence of some age cohort-race-state-year cells with zero births. In the main regression results presented here, I set zero cells to an arbitrarily small number before taking logs. However, I have run two tests to check the sensitivity of my results. I first eliminate the oldest cohort, where most of the zero cells occur. Results are qualitatively similar, but slightly smaller in magnitude. Second, I employ a technique developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) that explicitly accounts for both the fractional nature of the dependent variable and the presence of zero values. Again, results are similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those presented here. 12 If a one-year lag structure is used, results are qualitatively similar but the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is slightly smaller.
However, it is possible that there exist systematic differences in first birth rates across states that are correlated with, but not caused by the state-level mandates. If this unobserved heterogeneity exists, one way to estimate the effects of the mandates accurately is to identify a treatment group for whom the mandates should have a direct effect, and a control group for whom they should not. This approach allows for estimation of the parameter of interest without bias. To this end, I use age cohort as a way of distinguishing a treatment group and a control group. The probability that a woman experiences infertility is extremely low for young women, and increases with age. Those women most likely to be affected by the mandates are those who have delayed childbearing, and specifically those women 35 and older. 13 As such, I interact the mandate with an identifier for whether the birth rates are for age cohorts 35 and older. The estimated coefficient γ will pick up any unobserved heterogeneity in birth rates that is correlated with the state mandates. The effect of the mandates on the treatment group of older women,θ , will then be estimated without bias.
One potential concern with this approach is the possibility that women under 35 may be a contaminated control group. This could happen for two reasons that would affect my results in opposing directions. First, younger women might also be receiving infertility treatments.
Alternatively, it is possible that younger women may be more likely to delay childbearing if they know infertility treatment is covered by their insurance. An alternative way to think of the methodological approach is to interpret γ as the estimated effect of the mandates on all women, and θ as the additional effect on older women. The estimate of γ would be positive if the first effect dominated, and negative if the second effect was larger. As another robustness check, I The Z vector controls for variables that will vary across states and over time that might also affect birth rates. These include variables that reflect economic conditions, including the state unemployment rate, log median usual weekly earnings, log tenth percentile weekly usual earnings, and female labor force participation rates. 14 A variable describing whether parental involvement is required for minors to obtain an abortion is also included. 15 The Z vector also includes the log maximum level of state welfare benefits available to a family of three. 16 The specification also includes state fixed effects (S j ) to control for any time-invariant unobserved state characteristics that may influence age-specific birth rates, year fixed effects (T t ) to control for national trends in birth rates over time, and age fixed effects (A a ), as well as a complete set of age-year interactions to allow for differential trends in birth rates by age over time. 17 The error term is represented by ε. Difference-in-differences estimation can lead to artificially low standard error estimates if the outcomes and the policy changes of interest are serially correlated (Bertrand et al., 2002) . I calculate White robust standard errors clustered by state to correct for this potential problem. Regressions are weighted by the population counts in each cell.
V. Results
A. Main Results
14 Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) find that parental characteristics vary systematically depending on the unemployment rate at the time of a baby's conception. 15 Fertility regressions also often include restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortions. I do not control for these policies here, since few states changed these policies over my sample period (see Levine, 2002 (Mathews and Hamilton, 2002) .
Results from the estimation of equation (1) can be found in Column 1 of One argument for expanding coverage made by proponents of mandates is that there are currently large differences in access to treatment. White, married women with high levels of income are most likely to seek and to receive treatment for infertility (e.g. Stephen and Chandra, 2000) . While I cannot test for effects by marital status or income with these data, I can test 18 The results in Table 3 are similar to results in an earlier, preliminary paper (Schmidt, 2005) . 19 Levine (2002) finds that parental involvement laws decrease abortion rates for younger teens but have no significant effects on births. 20 As a comparison, reports from the Center for Disease Control imply that roughly 11,000 live births to women over 25 resulted from IVF cycles that began in 1998. Many of these births would have occurred in 1999.
whether the mandates are having differential effects on birth rates by race. I re-estimate the model separately by the race of the mother. These results, presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 , suggest that the effects of the mandates on the full sample are entirely driven by results for white women. There are no significant effects of the mandates on the first birth rates of African American women, either for the entire population or for the subgroup of women over 35, and the point estimates are much smaller than for white women.
While Table 3 shows that the mandates have a very large, positive, significant effect on first birth rates for women between the ages of 35-49, there is likely to be a great deal of heterogeneity within this group. In particular, demand for infertility services may increase with the age of the mother, leading to larger effects of the mandates at older ages. To test this, I allow the effect of the mandates to vary by age cohort. These results are presented in Table 4 . There are no significant effects of the mandates for women under 34. However, the coefficients on the mandate-age interactions are positive and significant for each age group beginning with the 35-39 year olds, and as would be expected, the effects increase in magnitude and statistical significance with age. The results suggest a 12% increase in first births among women aged 35-39, and a 32% increase for women 40-49. Due to the smaller coefficient for women 35-39 (who account for most of the births to older women), back-of-the-envelope calculations based on these coefficient estimates suggest a smaller effect of the mandates. These estimated coefficients would imply an additional 11,696 births to women 35-39, and an additional 5,659 births to women 40-49, or a total effect that is roughly half the magnitude of the impact suggested by Table 3 .
B. Robustness Tests
The enactment of state mandates will generally only help those individuals who already have access to health insurance. In Panel A of Table 5 , I interact the mandate variables with the share of the women 15-44 with private health insurance. 21 The estimated coefficients on the control variables in the regression are similar to those presented in Column 1 of Table 3 , so only the estimates of the mandate coefficients are presented here. The share of individuals with private insurance has a negative and significant effect on birth rates, but this is likely capturing omitted variables such as income that are correlated with both the likelihood of having private insurance and with fertility. The mandate interacted with private health insurance has no significant effect on first birth rates, but the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the presence of a mandate, the share of women with health insurance, and whether or not the age group is 35 and older is positive and statistically significant at the five-percent level.
In addition, even among those firms that provide their employee with health insurance, not all are subject to the mandates. First, the smallest firms are generally exempt from the mandates. Second, under the Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), firms that self-insure are exempt from the mandates. It has been argued that the passage of mandates could induce firms to self-insure in order to avoid compliance (e.g. Jensen et al. (1995) ). Ideally, I would have information on the share of employees by state and year in firms that self insure.
However, these data are not available. 22 It has been shown that the primary determinant of selfinsurance by firms is firm size, with large firms being significantly more likely to self-insure (Park, 2000) . In panel B of Park (2000) provides data on the share of employees in firms that self-insure by state for 1993. While there is a great deal of variation by state, the average self-insurance rate for the mandate states in 1993 is 47.9%, compared with the average self-insurance rate for the non-mandate states of 48.8%. (These figures exclude Hawaii, which has an employer mandate for health insurance coverage that predates ERISA, and is therefore not subject to ERISA preemption).
the share of women who work (or who have a spouse that work) in firms of a particular size.
(Categories are less than 25 employees, 25-99 employees, and more than 100 employees.) 23 While none of the interactions between the firm size variables and the mandate variables are statistically different from zero, the point estimates suggest that all of the action on mandates for women over the age of 35 is in the mid-size firms (this coefficient is extremely large and is close to achieving statistical significance at the 10 percent level), which is consistent with employees in both the smallest and the largest firms having less access. The total effect of the mandates (summing the coefficients across firm size) is still zero for the overall population, and is still positive and statistically significant for women over the age of 35.
In Panel C of Table 5 , I allow mandates covering all health plans to affect births differently than mandates that either exclude HMOs or that only cover HMOs, by replacing the dummy variable for mandate with the share of the population that is covered by the mandate.
For states with no mandate, this variable is equal to zero; for states with a mandate covering all health plans, it is equal to one; for states with mandates only covering HMOs, it is equal to the HMO penetration rate; and for states with mandates excluding HMOs, and it is equal to one minus the HMO penetration rate. 24 The main results presented above are robust to this alternate specification. The share of the population covered by the mandate has no significant effect on overall first birth rates, but has a positive and significant effect for women over 35.
It is also possible that the effect of the mandates on first birth rates varies depending on the type of mandate enacted. In particular, one might expect a "mandate to cover" to affect births differently than a "mandate to offer", or a mandate that includes IVF to affect births differently than one that excludes IVF. In Table 6 Column 5 presents results omitting New York. Column 6 presents results that omit both states.
The effect of mandates to cover remains fairly stable at approximately a 15-16 percent increase across these specifications (although this effect is not precisely estimated). However, omitting
California and New York from the sample completely removes any estimated effect of the mandates that exclude IVF, suggesting that the results in Column 3 are completely driven by these large states.
As a final robustness check, I re-estimate the model using log second and higher parity birth rates as the dependent variable. If infertility treatments are more likely to be sought by women who have not already given birth, the effects of mandates on higher parity birth rates should be smaller. Results in Table 7 confirm this. The estimated coefficient on mandates for women over 35 falls from 0.32 for first birth rates to 0.20 for second and higher birth rates, and is no longer statistically different from zero.
VI. Conclusion
For a woman or couple faced with fertility problems, a conception and birth is the ultimate goal. From this perspective, it appears as if the state-level infertility insurance mandates have been a success, as I find that the mandates significantly increase first birth rates among women over 35. The estimated effects increase with age, and are robust to a wide variety of specification tests. Despite the rhetoric of increased access that has surrounded the enactment of mandates, the mandates have had no effect on the first birth rates of African American women.
As demographic changes and continued trends in delay of childbearing cause infertility to become an increasingly common medical problem, advocacy groups are likely to continue to pressure policymakers to enact mandated benefits at both the state and federal levels. Insurance providers are likely to continue to resist these pressures. A full evaluation of the effects of these mandated benefits is essential to informing this policy debate. Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the first birth rate in a state-year-race-age cohort cell. All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a full set of age-year interactions. White robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by cell-level population counts. Levels of statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** at the five-percent level; and * at the ten-percent level. Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as age*year interactions. Regressions are weighted by cell-level population counts. Levels of statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** at the five-percent level; and * at the ten-percent level.
embryo lavage, embryo transfer, artificial insemination, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, zygote intrafallopian tube transfer, and low ovum tube transfer. To qualify:
• The patient must be unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy after one year of unprotected sexual intercourse.
• The patient must be unable to obtain successful pregnancy through other less costly infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the policy.
• The patient must have undergone fewer than four oocyte retrievals, unless a live birth has resulted from a completed oocyte retrieval, in which case she is entitled to two more covered retrievals.
• The procedure must be performed at a medical facility meeting the standards set by either the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American Fertility Society.
No other restrictions exist; however, the insurer does not have to pay for:
• The reversal of voluntary sterilization.
• Costs rendered to a surrogate for purposes of childbirth • The cryopreservation and storage of sperm, eggs, and embryos.
• Non-medical costs of a sperm or egg donor, including travel costs.
• Experimental treatments.
Furthermore, religious organizations which find these policies to be at odds with their moral and ethical teachings are exempt from providing coverage.
(www.ins.state.il.us/HealthInsurance/infert.htm)
Maryland
As of 1985, Maryland requires that insurers of individuals and groups, including HMO's, must provide coverage of in vitro fertilization to the same extent as pregnancy-related services are provided. To qualify:
• The patient must be the policyholder or the spouse of the policyholder and must be a covered dependent under that policy.
• The patient must have her oocytes fertilized by her spouse's sperm.
• The patient and her spouse must have a history of unexplained infertility for at least two years, or must have one or more of the following medical conditions: 1. Endometriosis 2. Exposure in utero to Diethylstillbestrol (DES) 3. Blockage or removal of one or both fallopian tubes, not as a result of voluntary sterilization. 4. Abnormal male factors.
• The patient must have been unable to obtain successful pregnancy through other less costly infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the policy.
• The in vitro procedure must be performed at a medical facility meeting the standards set by either the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American Fertility Society.
Benefits may not exceed a maximum lifetime benefit of $100,100. In 2002 the state of NY passed a revised law, which clarified the 1990 law and appropriated $10 million to a pilot project to help pay for in vitro procedures for a small number of people who received care from those facilities that were to be the beneficiaries of grants awarded through the program.
(New York Consolidated Laws, Insurance, Section 3221(k)(6), Section 4303(s).)
Ohio
Under a 1991 law, Ohio includes coverage for infertility services as part of its basic health care services, and, as such, covers the medically necessary diagnosis and correction of problems causing infertility. There is no specific law covering in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, or zygote intrafallopian transfer; however, the Superintendent of Insurance stated in 1997 that IVF, GIFT and ZIFT were not essential for the protection of an individual's health and were therefore not subject to mandated insurance coverage. Ohio has no definition of infertility, nor does it detail any other specific requirements or exemptions.
(www.ins.state.oh.us/Legal/Bulletins/97-1.htm)
Rhode Island
Rhode Island (1989) requires that all insurers which cover pregnancy-related benefits also cover the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, where "infertility" is defined as "the condition of an otherwise healthy married individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception during a period of one year." It further stipulates that the patient co-payment may not exceed 20%. There are no other requirements or exemptions. (Rhode Island General Laws, 
